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TEACHING EVIDENCE: USING CASEBOOKS, PROBLEMS, 
TRANSCRIPTS, SIMULATIONS, VIDEO CLIPS AND INTERACTIVE 
DVDs 
MIGUEL A. MÉNDEZ* 
I.  A PERIOD OF INNOVATION IN TEACHING METHODS 
I have been teaching Evidence in some form for over twenty-five years.  In 
that time, I have seen more changes in the approach to teaching Evidence than 
in any other subject.  I began teaching the course in what once was considered 
the traditional mode—using a casebook chockfull of appellate opinions which 
focused principally on one or two rules.  That was the way I was taught, and it 
was not long before this approach reminded me of the shortcomings of the 
course I took as a student. 
More than dissatisfaction with the traditional casebook approach prompted 
me to seek other ways to teach Evidence.  When I joined the Stanford faculty 
in 1977, the law school was beginning to experiment with a series of courses 
that employed innovative teaching methods. While the focus eventually shifted 
to the first-year curriculum, much of the impetus for the change stemmed from 
a very successful effort by the law school to enrich the second and third year 
curriculum with “clinical” courses.  These courses did not resemble the kinds 
of courses associated with today’s clinics.  Their purpose was not to teach 
students by having them handle aspects of cases accepted by law school 
sponsored or affiliated clinics.  Rather, the goal was to teach advanced 
substantive law courses through exercises that simulated the conditions 
practitioners encountered in a particular field.  The assumption was that 
students could best master and critique a field of law when they were required 
to put theory into practice. 
The first of these “clinical” courses was Advanced Criminal Law, taught 
by Professor Anthony Amsterdam with the help of a psychiatrist.  Students 
taking this course were expected to conduct a full direct and cross-examination 
of mental health experts testifying in hearings involving mentally disordered 
defendants raising diminished capacity and insanity claims. Another was 
Advanced Criminal Procedure, a course which I designed.  Students played the 
role of prosecutors or defense counsel in a criminal proceeding, from 
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arraignment through trial, including a hearing on a suppression motion.  As in 
the case of Professor Amsterdam’s Advanced Criminal Law course, use was 
made of forensic experts and police officers, and much of the course was 
devoted to the direct and cross-examination of experts.  Members of the Palo 
Alto community served as jurors. 
Juvenile Law, taught by Professor Mike Wald, was one of the earliest of 
the clinical courses and had both simulation and live client components.  
Students who successfully completed the simulation part were allowed to 
represent clients in the local juvenile court under the supervision of a faculty 
member.  By the early 1980s, the number of “clinical” courses had expanded to 
include Advanced Real Estate Transactions, Injunctions, Freedom of 
Information, Expert Testimony, Complex Litigation, and Advanced Evidence. 
The clinical courses proved to be enormously popular.  To assure 
participation by the maximum number of students, the clinical faculty devised 
its own application process.  Students admitted to one course were dropped to 
the bottom of a waiting list when applying for a second course.  By the early 
1980s, about one-third of the upper division students could be offered an 
opportunity to take one clinical course. 
In part, the “clinical” courses were popular because they contrasted sharply 
with the teaching methods employed in the traditional classes.  In the late 
1970s, Stanford faculty still adhered to the Socratic method as the principal 
mode of teaching and assessing doctrine.  In contrast, the tasks the students 
were asked to perform in the clinical courses required the students to go 
beyond case analysis and engage in systematic problem-solving in concrete 
situations similar to those encountered by practitioners in diverse fields.  
Particularly in clinical courses emphasizing adversarial hearings, students 
learned that it would be up to them to decide which witnesses to call, the order 
in which to call them, and the content and order of the questions asked.  
Because the settings for the clinical exercises were adversarial, students 
learned that much of what transpired in their cases depended on their initiative 
as lawyers.  Of course, performing these tasks required a mastery of Evidence. 
Much class time was devoted by the clinical instructors and class members 
to assessing the performance of the students doing the exercises.  Camcorders 
(thought of at the time as a kind of movie camera) were just coming into use 
and provided an almost “instant replay” means to review and critique what 
students did right and wrong.  Students who were not doing the exercise were 
required to lead the critique of a particular exercise, such as the direct 
examination of an expert.  Forms were developed by some instructors to guide 
the students in providing a useful assessment.  Use of the tapes foreshadowed 
the use of the now popular “video clip” to assist in illustrating some Evidence 
rules. 
In my twenty-seven years at Stanford, no period can compare with the late 
1970s and early 1980s as a time when interest in experimenting with new 
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teaching methods was paramount. Stanford was a recognized leader in 
pioneering the use of simulations in teaching advanced substantive courses.  
But although there was significant cooperation among faculty teaching the 
clinical courses, neither the administration, the students, nor the professors 
viewed the courses as a distinct concentration.  What was taught in a given 
year depended on the interest and availability of regular faculty, visitors, and 
the effectiveness of students lobbying for a particular course. 
The dependence on faculty willingness to teach a clinical course proved to 
be a major weakness.  The departure in the early 1980s of a number of 
instructors devoted to clinical teaching reduced significantly the number of 
clinical courses taught by tenure-line faculty members on a regular basis.  The 
amount of time required to teach in the simulated mode further reduced the 
number of clinical courses.  Those of us involved in clinical teaching soon 
discovered that it simply was not possible to teach in this mode and have the 
time necessary to devote to scholarly endeavors.  Since in hiring and 
promoting faculty Stanford did not distinguish between professors using 
traditional teaching methods and those employing clinical approaches, many 
instructors gave up their clinical courses to free up time for their scholarly 
projects.  Still, the success of the clinical courses had two immediate effects.  
First, it encouraged other professors to use some clinical methods, such as 
problem solving and simulations, in their courses.  Equally important, the 
success of the courses led to the “B Curriculum,” which for a number of years 
was an alternative to the traditional first-year curriculum at Stanford. 
I have described the successes and failures of the “B Curriculum” in an 
article on teaching Criminal Law from a trial perspective1 and will not recount 
that history here.  But I do want the reader to know that my experimenting with 
diverse teaching methods in Evidence arose during a period when innovative 
teaching was highly prized at Stanford.  Institutional support is crucial to 
innovations in pedagogy. 
II.  FROM TRADITIONAL TO NON-TRADITIONAL APPROACHES 
California was among the first jurisdictions to adopt an evidence code.2  
When I took Evidence in the mid 1960s, California was on the cusp of 
adopting the evidence code.  Although the California Evidence Code was the 
product of a multi-year study undertaken by the California Law Revision 
Commission to determine whether the state should adopt the Uniform Rules of 
 
 1. See Miguel A. Méndez, On Teaching Criminal Law from a Trial Perspective, 48 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1181 (2004). 
 2. The California legislature adopted the California Evidence Code in 1965.  Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129, 131 
(1987).  The Evidence Code went into effect on January 1, 1967.  See CAL. EVID. CODE § 12 
(2006). 
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Evidence,3 the casebook my professor assigned did not give a single hint that 
codification of the rules had been the subject of ample study.  This was 
surprising since the codification effort had begun early in the twentieth 
century.4  By 1942, the American Law Institute had approved the Model Code 
of Evidence.5  The Model Code was succeeded in 1953 by the Uniform Rules 
of Evidence when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws sought to eliminate some of the objections that had been raised to 
some of the provisions of the Model Code.6 
The failure of the casebook to draw attention to the codification efforts was 
unfortunate.  It left us, the students, with the impression that Evidence was a 
common law subject in which the rules were “discovered” and “announced” by 
appellate judges resolving discrete evidentiary disputes.  We came to believe 
that learning the rules and some of their justifications depended on our ability 
to research appellate opinions in a given jurisdiction.  Even mastering the rules 
in the cases selected by the casebook editors depended on the skills we learned 
in the first year of law school about how to read and analyze appellate 
opinions.  This case by case approach to the rules of evidence prevented us 
from viewing the subject as one essentially concerned with regulating the kinds 
of information that should be presented, especially to jurors, and precluded a 
consideration of the rules from a trial advocacy perspective. 
In one of the most popular Evidence casebooks, Professors John Kaplan, 
David Louisell, and Jon Waltz sought in 1968 to supplement the common law 
approach to Evidence by including pertinent sections of the California 
Evidence Code.7  When the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect in 
1975, some of its provisions were added in subsequent editions.8  Although the 
incorporation of the statutory material helped to alert students to the 
codification that had begun to replace the common law approach to Evidence, 
appellate cases focusing on one or two rules remained the main pedagogical 
tool.9  Professor Waltz recognized some of the shortcomings of the appellate 
opinion approach.  A good example is the section of his and Professor Park’s 
book dealing with the use of other misdeeds to prove not character, but such 
 
 3. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 132. 
 4. Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 
IOWA L. REV. 413, 431–32 (1989). 
 5. Id. at 432. 
 6. See Recommendatioin of the California Law Revision Commission Proposing an 
Evidence Code, xxix, xxxii–iii, reprinted in WEST’S ANN. CAL. EVID. CODE (1995). 
 7. See DAVID W. LOUISELL, JOHN KAPLAN & JON R. WALTZ, EVIDENCE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 399, 429 (3d ed. 1976). 
 8. See DAVID W. LOUISELL, JOHN KAPLAN & JON R. WALTZ, EVIDENCE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 901 (4th ed. 1981). 
 9. See generally id. 
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propositions as common plan or scheme.10  Rather than using cases to illustrate 
these rules, the authors quoted extensively11 from Dean Charles McCormick’s 
summary in his treatise on Evidence.12  Equally important, to help students 
understand the process of proof, the book included an excellent piece by 
Professor Waltz on “Making the Record.”13 
Professors Richard Lempert and Stephen Saltzburg were among the first 
scholars to publish a book that abandoned the appellate opinion approach to 
teaching Evidence.  In their path-breaking book, A Modern Approach to 
Evidence,14 they replaced the cases with text setting out the rules and 
discussing their significance.  By abandoning appellate opinions, Professors 
Lempert and Saltzburg freed up valuable time to discuss the merits of the rules 
and to consider useful excerpts by commentators.15  Their explanation of 
related concepts is often invaluable.  For example, they provide an excellent 
analysis of how Bayesian logic could help fact-finders resolve factual 
controversies.16  In addition, Professors Lempert and Saltzburg were sensitive 
to the need to introduce students to examining the rules of evidence from a trial 
perspective.  They begin their book with a transcript of a criminal trial that 
contains the opening statements and closing arguments in addition to the 
testimony of witnesses,17 and they frequently ask students to take a trial 
lawyer’s concerns into account when assessing some of the rules.18 
Giving students an appreciation of the problems faced by trial counsel and 
trial judges is, in my opinion, indispensable to the successful teaching of 
Evidence.  Appellate opinions, focusing almost exclusively on the concerns of 
the appellate bench, are poor material for attaining this goal.  Although 
replacing cases with text eliminates a highly inefficient method of learning 
discrete evidentiary rules, even discussions about the process of proof often 
fail to give students a concrete idea of how the dynamics of a trial affect what 
trial lawyers do.  I have attempted to compensate for this deficiency by writing 
an Evidence text19 that describes the link between the process of proof and the 
 
 10. See Jon R. Waltz & Roger C. Park, Evidence: Cases and Materials 402 (10th ed. 2004). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 557–65 (Edward W. Cleary et al. eds., 3d ed. 
1984). 
 13. See WALTZ & PARK, supra note 10, at 1. 
 14. See RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO 
EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES (lst ed. 1977). 
 15. See id. at 413 (discussing Professor Tribe’s article on triangulating hearsay). 
 16. See RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO 
EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, TRANSCRIPTS AND CASES 157 (2d ed. 1982). 
 17. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
 18. See id. at 4. 
 19. MIGUEL A. MÉNDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE AND THE FEDERAL RULES—A 
PROBLEM APPROACH (3d ed. 2004). 
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adversarial system of trials, and that makes use of a witness examination 
format to illustrate how lawyers use some of the rules of evidence. 
In my book, I emphasize that the rules are designed to promote reliable 
verdicts by limiting the kind of information that can be offered to fact-finders 
in reconstructing a historical event whose contours are contested by the 
parties.20  I then explain that the application of the rules depends principally on 
party initiative.  Under the general rule that applies in all American 
jurisdictions, evidence offered by a party will be admitted unless it is objected 
to by the opposing party and the objection is sustained.21  That leads to a 
discussion of the roles of judges, jurors, and counsel, especially of the lawyers’ 
goals in formulating and executing a trial strategy.22  One of the most useful 
questions I ask students at the beginning of the course is to identify the most 
important actor in American jury trials.  Invariably, they mistakenly select the 
judge, and their error leads to eye-opening discussions of the adversarial 
system of litigation.  I also ask students, again at the beginning of the course, 
to identify who gets to speak at an American jury trial and when the words 
spoken constitute “evidence.” 
But even an explanation of the relationship of trial advocacy to the rules of 
evidence will not give students a firm sense of how evidence is actually offered 
and contested in a trial.  The very best way to convey this sense is to ask 
students to demonstrate, say, the introduction of a contract in a breach of 
contract action by having them conduct the direct and cross-examination of the 
principal witness.  Since this would consume too much time except in the 
smallest of classes, alternatives include having only some students demonstrate 
the exercise or simply showing a video or DVD clip of students performing the 
exercise.  I have experimented with both methods.  I have also experimented 
with a third method that allows students to rule and explain their rulings in 
class.  This method is somewhat more practical in large classes.  In my book, 
many of the problems following the principal discussion sections are in the 
form of witness examinations.  Although not intended as model interrogations, 
they do give students a concrete idea of how the calling party attempts to elicit 
favorable testimony and how the opponent attempts to block this effort by 
invoking specific rules of evidence.  The examinations do not provide the 
judge’s ruling.  Instead, students are expected to rule and explain their rulings 
in class. 
III.  FIVE MODELS FOR TEACHING EVIDENCE 
There are, of course, more than five models for teaching Evidence.  In this 
section, I limit myself to comparing the five models I have used. 
 
 20. Id. at 1. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at §§ 1.02–.04. 
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A. Casebooks 
The first, and least successful, was teaching the course from a casebook 
that emphasized appellate opinions.  Requiring students to recall the “facts” of 
each case for the limited purpose of identifying and discussing one or two rules 
of evidence was unduly time-consuming and did not facilitate a discussion of 
the rules from a trial advocacy perspective. 
B. Simulations and Video Reviews 
Frustration with the casebook method led me to try the most labor-
intensive approach to teaching Evidence: supplementing the casebook by 
having some students do some exercises on direct and cross-examination, 
including marking and offering documents, and then having all students in 
teams of two represent a party in a simulated civil or criminal proceeding.  
When I first taught the course, it was a four-unit, one-semester course.  
Although enrollment was limited to twenty students, a four-unit course did not 
provide the hours needed to cover the theory and practice parts of the course.  
By the time I taught the course a second time, students selected for the course 
had to commit their weekends and one entire weekday afternoon in addition to 
the regularly scheduled hours.  We used about a third of the weekends in a 
semester to hold or review trials.  Enrollment was not a problem, as at the time 
student interest in “hands on” courses was at its highest. 
Still, the toll on the students, and especially me, proved too high.  By the 
third time I taught the course, it had evolved into a two-semester, six-unit 
course.  The first semester was devoted to covering the material in the 
casebook and the second to the exercises.  Even then, however, the number of 
hours we met in the second semester exceeded the number allocated to the 
course.  Typically, the trials would take from four to six hours each and the 
review of selected parts of the video tapes about four hours.  Since students 
performed in teams of two, I had to script five trials in addition to the “warm 
up” short exercises on how to perform direct and cross-examination.  
Eventually, the demands proved too much, and the course was reduced first to 
sixteen students and finally to twelve. 
Four students in teams of two played the role of lawyers in each of the 
trials.  Some of the remaining students served as witnesses.  To ensure that the 
other students maintained an active interest in the course, they played the role 
of jurors and had to deliberate and reach a verdict.  At the conclusion of the 
trial, the “jurors” had to explain why they found for a particular party.  In 
addition, some jurors were selected before the trial to assess the performance 
of one of the lawyers on the direct or cross-examination of a particular witness.  
To help them make informed critiques, the students were required to use an 
assessment form which called for specificity in their criticisms.  The students, 
for example, were required to specify exactly what was wrong with the 
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question posed or with the answer given, or with the order of the examination, 
including the order of witnesses. 
The critiques were supplemented by the video tape reviews.  During the 
trial, I would note the number on the tape where a particularly interesting 
episode took place and would go to that spot during the review.  Time 
constraints prevented us from reviewing all of the tapes of a trial, so it was 
important to select those portions from which the most could be learned by the 
“lawyers” and the rest of the class.  A great advantage of video tapes was that 
often they did not require commentary by class members or me.  The tape 
spoke for itself.23 
The course was extraordinarily successful by most measures.  Student 
evaluations were very high, often perfect.  Students believed they had learned 
not just the rules but also how to apply them.  As a former trial lawyer, I knew 
that almost all of the students were prepared to represent a party in an actual 
adversarial proceeding and, equally important, could assess the rules from both 
theoretical and practical perspectives.  Countervailing pressures, however, 
ultimately led to my abandoning this very successful approach to teaching 
Evidence.  The principal one was the culture of Stanford Law School.  
Scholarship is prized above all other academic activities.  The time required to 
design and teach a highly labor intensive course often left inadequate time for 
research and writing.  Since at the time, Stanford made no distinction between 
instructors who used traditional teaching methods and those who used 
simulations, using labor intensive teaching methods was especially risky prior 
to attaining tenure.  But even those of us who were tenured eventually 
abandoned the use of labor-intensive teaching methods.  It did not take us long 
to realize that we could not advance an ambitious scholarly agenda while 
teaching “clinically.” 
Paul Brest, who was then dean of the law school and an early champion of 
alternative modes of instruction, continued to encourage the development of 
innovative teaching methods.  He made it clear that contributions to the 
development of new teaching methods would count as much as scholarly 
works, at least for tenured members of the faculty.  Also, he was prepared to 
grant faculty members some release time from teaching if needed to develop 
courses employing innovative teaching methods.  At the time, Paul and a group 
of faculty members were especially interested in developing “self-study” 
course materials that would allow students to learn on their own.  I volunteered 
to try my hand at developing materials for teaching Evidence.  Eventually, 
these materials became my Evidence textbook. 
 
 23. At one time I entertained the hope of editing the tapes into teaching tapes that could be 
used in any Evidence course to demonstrate what and what not to do during the examination of 
different types of witnesses.  Again, time constraints prevented me from undertaking this project. 
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C. The Problem Approach 
I began by using a casebook which had an excellent collection of cases, but 
found the process of having the students recall and describe the issues raised 
by the cases unduly time-consuming.  Using cases presented another problem.  
Opinions focus almost exclusively on the concerns of appellate judges and 
often fail to convey a feel for the problems facing the trial judge and trial 
counsel.  At the beginning, I tried to compensate for these deficiencies by 
preparing a handbook that students used in conjunction with the casebook and 
that presented most of the cases in the book in the form of a witness 
examination or a problem. 
The student response to the handbook was very positive.  The difficulty of 
trying to recall the “facts” of a case was eliminated, and using transcripts of 
witness examinations gave students an opportunity to visualize the process of 
presenting and objecting to evidence.  In turn, viewing evidence as presented 
in court helped them understand the rules in practice as well as in theory, and it 
enabled them to ask important questions about the relationship of the rules to 
principles of trial advocacy. 
The next step was to transform the handbook into self-study materials.  
One decision was easy—appellate cases were not to be the main source for the 
materials.  I decided to combine the problem and witness examination 
approach with text—not cases—that set out the law of evidence in a clear and 
concise manner.  The goal was to help the students learn the rules by having 
them read about Evidence and then having them apply their knowledge to 
discrete problems.24  Class time was to be devoted to reviewing their “rulings” 
and answering their questions. 
The challenge was to find a text that would work well with the problems 
and witness examinations.  Eventually, I opted for adapting the text from an 
Evidence treatise which I had prepared for lawyers who practice primarily in 
California state and federal courts.  Although derived from my treatise, the text 
of this book is not merely a black letter law distillation of the rules of 
evidence.25  Most of the discussion is devoted to the policies and concepts 
underlying the rules.  As a teacher and former trial lawyer, I believe that 
students will attain a better understanding of the rules by examining the 
concerns that initially drove judges and then legislators to place limits on the 
evidence parties can offer. 
 
 24. Other teachers had already adopted a text and problem approach to teaching Evidence.  
See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.  Among them were Professors Richard Lempert 
and Stephen Saltzburg, whose path-breaking text was first published in 1977, and Professors Jack 
Friedenthal and Michael Singer, who in 1985 published The Law of Evidence.  I do not discuss 
The Law of Evidence, as Professor Friedenthal has contributed an article to this issue. 
 25. Méndez, supra note 19.  The text is fully annotated and can be used by students for 
research as well as in practice after graduation. 
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The book’s twenty-nine chapters are organized by sections.  “Questions 
and Problems” that follow most discussion sections contain the problems and 
witness examinations.  The examinations are designed to raise significant 
evidentiary issues; they are not intended as model interrogations.  Indeed, most 
of the objections are “late” and if sustained would require in actual practice 
follow-up motions to strike and admonish.  But by using this approach, the 
student becomes aware of the nature of the contested evidence without the 
distraction required by offers of proof. 
The following is an example of the use of witness examinations to teach 
the use of prior consistent statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
In a federal prosecution of a police officer for violating the victim’s civil 
rights, the prosecutor calls Fellow Officer and Bystander who testify as 
follows: 
By the Prosecutor: What did the defendant do after he arrested and 
handcuffed the victim? 
Fellow Officer: He proceeded to beat him with his night stick for ten 
minutes. 
* * * 
By the Defense Attorney: You too were charged with beating the victim? 
Fellow Officer: Yes. 
By the Defense Attorney: But in exchange for your testimony here today 
the prosecutor promised to dismiss the charges against you? 
Fellow Officer: Yes. 
* * * 
By the Prosecutor: Prior to initiating plea negotiations with me, did you 
tell anyone about what you saw on the night of the beating? 
Fellow Officer: Yes, the day after the beating I said to my spouse, “The 
defendant proceeded to beat the victim with his night stick for ten 
minutes.” 
By the Defense Attorney: Objection, hearsay.  Move to strike. 
Judge: ? 
Compare with: 
By the Prosecutor: What did the defendant do after he arrested and 
handcuffed the victim? 
Bystander: He proceeded to beat him with his night stick for ten minutes. 
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* * * 
By the Defense Lawyer: Isn’t it true that two days after the incident you 
told your drinking buddy, “The defendant only beat the victim once to keep 
him from kicking bystanders.”? 
Bystander: Yes. 
By the Prosecutor: Objection. Move to strike on grounds of hearsay. 
Judge: ? 
* * * 
By the Prosecutor: The day following the beating, did you tell anyone 
about it? 
Bystander: Yes, I told my wife, “After the officer arrested and handcuffed 
the defendant, he proceeded to beat him with his night stick for ten 
minutes.” 
By the Defense Attorney: Objection.  Move to strike on grounds of 
hearsay. 
Judge: ?26 
The following is an example of a problem students must answer 
concerning the constitutionality of certain jury instructions in a criminal case: 
  Assume a prosecution for possessing stolen property.  The prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, in addition to possessing the 
property, the defendant was aware that it was stolen.  The owner testifies that 
the property is his and that he never gave it to the defendant.  The defendant 
testifies that he bought the property from a migrant worker and had no idea 
that it was stolen. 
  Determine the constitutionality of the following jury instructions: 
  If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a dealer in 
second-hand merchandise, that he bought stolen property, and that he bought 
such property under circumstances which should have caused him to make 
reasonable inquiry that the person from whom the defendant bought the 
property had the legal right to sell it, and that the defendant did not make such 
reasonable inquiry, 
(a) then you shall presume that the defendant bought such property 
knowing that it was stolen. 
 
 26. Id. at 258–59. 
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(b) then you shall presume that the defendant bought such property 
knowing that it was stolen unless the defendant persuades you by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he did not know it was stolen. 
(c) then you shall presume that the defendant bought such property 
knowing that it was stolen unless the defendant raises a reasonable doubt 
about whether he knew that it was stolen. 
(d) then you may, if you wish, infer that the defendant knew that the 
property was stolen, unless from all of the evidence you have a reasonable 
doubt whether the defendant knew that the property was stolen.27 
My book focuses on the California Evidence Code as well as the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.  California was among the first jurisdictions to replace the 
common law rules of evidence with a comprehensive code.28  The influence of 
the California Evidence Code in shaping the Federal Rules has been substantial 
and can be measured in part by the numerous times the framers of the Rules 
cite the Code as a model.  Over the years, many Evidence professors have 
found that students can gain valuable insights into problems of proof by 
comparing the approach of the Code and with that of the Rules in those 
instances where the two depart.  The book follows this tradition by providing a 
systematic comparison of the California and federal approaches to 
admissibility. 
Because the common law rules of evidence have been replaced largely by 
codes, today’s study of Evidence necessarily involves statutory interpretation.  
To help students with this task, Thomson West agreed to prepare a separate 
statutory supplement that includes the California Evidence Code and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as the comments and notes prepared by 
their drafters.  Because of space limitations, in my book I set out at the end of 
each chapter only those provisions of the Evidence Code and Federal Rules 
discussed in that chapter.  The text, however, discusses key cases and official 
commentary as well as important insights contributed by Evidence scholars. 
D. Advanced Evidence 
The problem approach largely achieves my goals.  Students do learn the 
rules of evidence from both a theoretical and practical perspective.  The use of 
even highly abridged witness examinations helps them visualize the process of 
proof.  Moreover, because we do not get bogged down with cases, I am able to 
cover much more material and in greater detail than when I used a casebook.  
Still, the course does not prepare students to conduct the direct or cross-
examination of witnesses, much less plan and execute a trial strategy.  To make 
up for some of these deficiencies, I now also teach Advanced Evidence, a 
 
 27. Id. at 635–36. 
 28. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
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course that focuses on the direct and cross-examination of certain kinds of 
witnesses, including investigator-types and experts.  In some ways, the course 
is not as ambitious as the simulated Evidence course.  Students do not get to 
try an entire case, from opening statements to closing arguments.  Breadth, 
however, is replaced by depth.29  The goal is to help proponents develop a 
narrative on direct examination that jurors will find irresistible and then to 
enable opponents to do a devastating cross of that witness.  Students work in 
troikas, and each member must play the role of direct examiner, cross-
examiner, and witness.  Students who are not performing the exercise lead the 
critique of the performances.  The final exercise is video-taped and, if time 
permits, the tape is used in the critiques. 
The time pitfalls of the simulated Evidence course are avoided.  Only 
students who have taken Evidence may enroll in Advanced Evidence.  
Although I do have to spend some time “refreshing” the students on concepts 
they learned (or should have learned) in their Evidence course, most time is 
devoted to trial advocacy.  Of greater importance, Advanced Evidence is 
limited to six students, each of whom conducts only two directs and two 
crosses.  Although the total number of examinations is still large, 24, the 
number can be managed in the two units allocated to the course.  The course is 
taught during our January Term, a short but intensive semester sandwiched 
between the Fall and Spring Terms.  Classes meet everyday for two and a half 
hours for ten consecutive week days.  The time allocated for each class is 
sufficient for the direct and cross of two witnesses and the critique.  Meeting 
on consecutive days allows a continuity that enhances learning as well as the 
more effective use of class time.  The same mistakes are made less frequently, 
greater creativity is demonstrated, and critiques become shorter. 
E. Interactive DVDs and Video Tapes 
I use interactive DVDs as an aid in teaching the problem-approach 
Evidence course and Advanced Evidence.  When time permits, I use the DVDs 
in class and ask students to provide answers to the problems posed.  If time 
constraints preclude the use of the DVDs in class, I ask students to complete at 
least one DVD on their own time. 
The DVDs I use were developed by my colleague, Tim Hallahan, Director 
of Stanford’s Advocacy Skills Workshop, and include State v. Gilbert (general 
evidence review in a criminal case), Francis v. Spindler (hearsay in a personal 
injury case), Easerly v. Letwin (relevance and character in a real estate case), 
Examining Expert Witnesses: Evidence and Tactics (wrongful death case), and 
Trial Evidence & Direct Examination Skills (advanced evidence in a 
 
 29. Students, however, are given this opportunity in another course, Trial Advocacy. 
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commercial case).30  In most DVDs, the student plays the role of an attorney 
while his or her opponent examines a witness.  The student “objects” by 
clicking the mouse or keyboard and responds to queries of the judge and 
arguments of the opponent before obtaining a ruling.  The student may also 
review tactics and techniques employed by opposing counsel.  At the end of 
the trial, the DVD provides students with a score based on correct and 
incorrect rulings. 
The DVDs can be done by a single student or by a group of students.  I 
encourage students to do the DVDs in small groups in order to stimulate 
discussion about the proper ruling. Most students complete more than one 
DVD.  They report finding this form of learning both enjoyable and effective. 
I also use Judge Irving Younger’s video tape on the Ten Commandments of 
Cross-Examination31 in the problem course and in Advanced Evidence.  In the 
latter course, I refrain from playing the video tape until after all students have 
completed the exercises on direct and cross-examination.  Once they have 
mastered the fundamentals of interrogating witnesses, the students are in a 
position to appreciate fully Judge Younger’s advice. 
IV.  SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
In my experience, DVDs and videos are useful aids in teaching Evidence.  
They help drive points home but are not a substitute for materials for teaching 
the course.  I have found that simulations are the most effective means for 
teaching both evidence theory and practice, but simulations are impractical, 
except in very small classes, if the goal is to give each student an opportunity 
to do the direct and cross of at least one witness.  Even when I have used 
simulations, I have had to provide the students with study materials in the form 
of a casebook or the text and problem approach I have described.  Although the 
problem approach works better for me, many Evidence professors still prefer 
the traditional approach and use casebooks.  Fortunately for all of us teaching 
Evidence, today we have many more choices in teaching materials and 
methods than a generation ago. 
 
 
 30. For additional information on the DVDs, contact Professor Hallahan at his e-mail 
address: thh47@pacbell.net. 
 31. Irvin Younger, Ten Commandments of Cross-Examination (National Institute for Trial 
Advocacy 1975). 
